Winning Hearts and Minds in Afghanistan
Whenever I hear the phrase “winning hearts and minds” in a military campaign context I shudder. I saw firsthand in Vietnam how crude of an instrument armed forces are at conducting operations designed to win over native populations in combat zones.
Armed forces are trained to destroy, not build. To kill, not to heal. And at least for the powerful American forces to pulverize the enemy with an awesome show of offensive power. Armed forces on dangerous combat missions are not going to show much consideration for whoever foolishly gets in the way of their military objective, even if they are seeking cover in their own homes.
With an insurgency the guy who looks like a farmer may just have an unfriendly AK47 tucked away close by. You can’t afford to take too many second looks and expect to survive in a war zone.
In Vietnam often enough it was “kill them all, let God sort them out”. Perhaps in Afghanistan the American and NATO troops have a different saying. But I expect that the result in hot combat zones is about the same.
Until recently President Bush would speak of Afghanistan as a great success story. He even had the mayor of Kubul, President Hamid Karzai visit him in the White House a time or two and even speak before a joint session of congress. Quite an honor for a man who has proved to be a weak and ineffective leader. Now five years after the offensive against the Taliban began we don’t hear too much about the liberation of Afghanistan and the democratic government duly elected by the people.
Washington and the NATO forces have a problem. You might call it the return of the Taliban. The Taliban have proved to be a tough, unrelenting, brutal, very stubborn foe. In Southern Afghanistan they have been particularity effective in once again controlling much of the countryside. NATO nor Washington expected this much of a fight five years after the Taliban were thought to have been defeated.
The problem with “winning the hearts and minds” of the people in fighting an insurgency is that the insurgents that you are fighting are usually drawn mostly from the local population. They are therefore difficult to clearly identify, especially from the air. As you fight the insurgents you invariably make tragic mistakes and target innocent civilians, the same men, women, and children that you are trying to win over to your side. Understandably as you kill and wound an increasing number of local civilians support for your forces among the population drops.
This is the problem that NATO and the Americans now face in Afghanistan. The Taliban may not be liked by many in the Afghan communities that they take over but at least they are not dropping bombs on their homes and fields as are the invading and occupying forces.
Afghanistan for centuries has been a tough row to hoe for foreign armies. No army has for long been able to stand up to the merciless tribes. Foreign armies are slowly drained of energy and the will to continue the fight by the inhospitable landscape, the harsh weather, and the fierce resistance.
It appears that it will be much tougher to defeat the Taliban, drug dealers, and warlords, even with vastly on paper superior forces, than NATO had thought. Some in Europe and Washington are slowly coming to the conclusion that victory may prove to be as elusive in Afghanistan as it is in Iraq.
While the war for control of Afghanistan continues NATO and the Americans battle rising hostility in Afghanistan. Every time I hear the phase “winning the hearts and minds” of the people I shudder.
